Danbee Blog
8/5
2011
2011
Being Perceptive to Workplace Violence
In the summer of 2010, a driver accused of stealing beer from the Connecticut beer distributor he worked for, killed eight workers before turning the weapon on himself. According to one union official, the worker ran through the warehouse with the gun and “all hell broke loose.”
Earlier in 2010, eight employees were shot, three of them critically, at a St. Louis manufacturing facility. In this case as well, the gunman committed suicide after taking the lives of co-workers.
Violence in the workplace is a threat that most executives take seriously but few actually plan for. It is a risk however, that cannot be ignored. Aside from the ethical obligation of providing a safe and secure work environment for employees, there is also a legal responsibility as well. As some companies have already learned, failing to do so can result in serious injury or fatality, damaging media publicity, employee morale issues and costly litigation.
It is important to understand that a relatively small percentage of workplace violence is spontaneous. The preponderance of the time, there are warning signals. Although subtle, they are oftentimes present and recognizing them can mean the difference between being caught by surprise or preempting violence from occurring in your company.
Media reports indicated that in the case of the Connecticut beer distributor, the driver’s actions might have been prompted by racial harassment. Whether or not this allegation had merit is in question. However, in matters of workplace homicides, it’s the perception of the individual that matters. If an employee’s sense of reality is that they have been wronged in some excessive or ongoing manner, whether it’s actually true becomes irrelevant from a risk perspective.
Extreme workplace violence takes place more frequently than most realize. These incidents are not confined to commercial establishments either, as evidenced by the shootings of six employees at the University of Alabama’s Huntsville campus in February 2010, or the shootings at the U.S. Army’s Ft. Hood in Texas where 13 died.
An ABC news article quoted Dr. Paul Ragan, senior consulting psychiatrist at Vanderbilt University Medical Center’s department of psychiatry, who stated, “Suicides and violence can increase in economic hard times. If anybody talks about an experience where they’ve been humiliated and they have feelings about it, it needs to be taken seriously. The workplace is often a source of disappointment, and is the unfortunate recipient of the person’s rage.”
Be Aware of Symptomatic Behavior
Here are some red flags that frequently precipitate violent acts. Providing this insight to managers and supervisors can enhance their awareness and perception, two important factors to preventing extreme job-related violence.
• Employees making threats or being threatened – Threats should never be downplayed or casually dismissed. While 99 out of 100 threats may not lead to violence, it is the one case you overlook that can cause irrevocable harm.
• Employees who anticipate a layoff or who are suddenly terminated – The anguish of losing a job can trigger an array of strong emotions, from anxiety to rage. Also, keep in mind that some employees do not wear their emotions on their sleeve. Consequently, it’s not always easy to anticipate their delayed reaction to job loss.
• Employees with serious problems at home – Oftentimes, domestic issues spill over into the workplace. Confrontations can range from assault to homicide.
• Employees using medication or illegal drugs – Mind-altering substances can exacerbate an individual’s state of mind, sometimes causing behavior completely out of character.
• Employees who display signs of paranoia – Be aware of employees who feel that they are being targeted for unjust criticism or ridicule by superiors or co-workers. While they may appear outwardly passive, they may eventually retaliate and seek revenge. Also, keep in mind that certain drugs, such as cocaine, can dramatically increase an individual’s level of paranoia.
• Employees showing a fascination for weapons – Obviously, the most significant problems involve violent acts committed with handguns and assault weapons.
6/2
2011
2011
Why Your Employee Dishonesty Insurance May Not Pay a Legitimate Claim
Insuring your company from employee theft is a unique form of coverage, different from loss caused by fire, flood, or even break and entry. Very few executives understand how it works, which is why so many legitimate claims are rejected each year.
If your facility is damaged by fire, water or forced entry, the physical evidence is apparent. It is essentially a matter for the insured to document the damage, tally the destroyed or missing inventory, and notify the insurance company. When it comes to documenting internal theft, however, you’re dealing with significantly different variables.
To begin with, your alarm system will not be going off in the middle of the night providing you with immediate notification that you’ve been victimized. Internal theft is a silent predator, normally taking place for months, and sometimes even years, before management becomes aware of its existence.
Another difference is the lack of readily available physical evidence that clearly proves the loss was caused by dishonest personnel. Most firms come to the realization that they are missing product only after receiving troublesome inventory reports or a confidential tip. Some warehousing executives wrongfully assume that inventory loss is the result of an operational problem, such as a software glitch, product mis-selections, or counting errors by inventory personnel, and the theft continues.
When management finally does become convinced that their loss is dishonesty related, they are faced with the difficult task of uncovering and documenting it. Unfortunately, this is not simply a matter of taking photographs of for example, water-damaged inventory. After all, it is hard to photograph product that has vanished.
It is safe to say that your insurance company will not be running to your door with a check simply because you notify them that you’ve been victimized by internal theft.
Most policies state that an insured must provide independent proof, in addition to a profit and loss statement, or inventory report, that corroborates that the theft was, in fact, committed by company employees. Consequently, the firm incurring the loss has the responsibility of performing an investigation and compiling evidence that proves that one or more employees stole the missing inventory. Without this independent corroboration, your financial computations alone simply will not count for much.
When properly prepared, and in conjunction with accurate financial computations, these forms of corroboration put the odds in your favor of having an inventory theft claim honored by your insurance company.
Undercover Reports – Factual observations made by a professional investigator working alongside company thieves.
Video Evidence – New technology makes it possible to conceal cameras inside smoke detectors, sprinkler heads and wall clocks, virtually undetectable.
Covert Surveillance Reports – Investigators who witness employees removing product from your warehouse or truck drivers delivering product to unauthorized locations.
Admissions of Guilt – Confession statements must be properly prepared and witnessed so it is clear that dishonest workers made their admissions without any duress, undue influence or coercion of any type.
4/13
2011
2011
2011 C-TPAT Conference
U.S. Customs & Border Protection recently held its annual Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Conference in San Diego, and once again this sold out gathering featured top caliber speakers.
In keeping with the theme, “A Decade of Supply Chain Security & Innovation”, Bradd Skinner, Director of the C-TPAT program, reflected upon the progress made in the last 10 years. Conceived in 2001 with only a handful of U.S. importers, C-TPAT now has over 10,000 business entities that have received C-TPAT certification. Globally, the C-TPAT program has become recognized as the standard for supply chain security excellence.
Director Skinner also provided insight into a number of important issues, including future direction for this historic program.
One of the points he made was the emphasis that C-TPAT will now place on “evidence of implementation“ during validations. Being actively involved with validations domestically and internationally, I’ve experienced this new focus firsthand. Whereas, the Supply Chain Security Specialist teams used to accept documents that simply formalized supply chain security policies and procedures, companies being validated are now required to prove that they are in fact being diligently followed.
When I was a speaker at the 2010 C-TPAT conference, I made the statement that most security programs look much better on paper than they actually work in reality. Danbee Investigations has performed supply chain security investigations and audits for over 25 years, ranging from inventory theft, sabotage, product tampering, and counterfeiting, to workplace substance abuse/distribution and smuggling.
We’ve repeatedly found the most major security breaches were the result of companies believing that their safeguards were far more effective than they ultimately proved to be. Company executives wrongly assumed that their asset protection safeguards incorporated best industry practices and were being diligently followed on a day-to-day basis. The reality for these companies was that many vulnerabilities existed, and were subsequently exploited.
By C-TPAT requiring companies to show proof of implementation, they will expose those companies not fully committed to implementing and consistently maintaining meaningful safeguards throughout their supply chain. Essentially, it is the “trust but verify” concept at work.
The February 2011 Global Awareness Bulletin published by the U.S. Department of State warns that American companies doing business in foreign countries may be targeted more aggressively by terrorist organizations like al-Qa’ida. Terrorists measure success not just in the number of victims but by the financial damage and long term costs associated with additional regulations governments are forced to enact to deter future terrorist incidents. Consequently, because of dramatically reduced inspection rates, C-TPAT certified companies automatically become high value targets.
If a C-TPAT member has superficial supply chain security controls in place they are at significatly higher risk of unknowingly transporting a conventional, biological, chemical or nuclear weapon into the United States. Obviously, safety is the number one concern. However, the ensuing panic, the widespread economic ramifications both domestically and abroad, as well as the financial and legal consequences for the company that imported the weapon of mass destruction would be catastrophic.
CBP’s mission is a daunting one. Unlike baseball, a .500 or .600 batting average will equate to failure rather than Hall of Fame status. While import volume to the U.S. may make perfection an unrealistic objective, striving for anything less creates an unacceptable level of risk. That’s why I not only understand CBP requiring evidence of implementation, I fully support this initiative.
3/2
2011
2011
Facility Break-Ins: “I Can’t Believe My Security System Was So Easy To Defeat!”
We’ve heard this statement repeatedly from executives whose companies have been victimized, usually accompanied by a dazed expression that can best be described as shock and awe.
In April 2010, a major pharmaceutical company’s Connecticut warehouse was burglarized by professional thieves who stole approximately $75 million of brand name drugs. According to reports, the thieves circumvented the electronic security systems in place with little difficulty while committing one of the largest distribution center thefts in history.
In the last few years, professional cargo theft rings have expanded their activities, no longer focusing only on trucks, rail cars and intermodal containers in transit. They have found it extremely lucrative to attack distribution centers and manufacturing plants, where they have repeatedly gotten away with millions of dollars of stolen inventory. Not bad for a few hours of work.
The truth of the matter is that these break-ins require a good deal of time to plan, prior to execution. It’s not unusual for example, for cargo rings to dispatch advance teams to surveil a targeted location for several weeks prior to their attack. Logistics such as the time the facility opens and closes, the number of employees on each shift, the traffic patterns of inbound and outbound trucks, whether there is on-site security and if so, how and where the manpower is appropriated, the design of the lighting and fencing, as well as the frequency of roving police patrols are just some of the factors that they carefully evaluate.
They’ve also been known to gain entry inside their targeted facilities posing as vendors, contractors, service people or sales representatives.
They will also have their members apply for jobs, many of whom have warehouse experience and are skilled at operating forklifts and other equipment. Once hired, they will assess the locations of all the alarm devices, what type of video system is in place, as well as the interior physical structure of the doors, walls and racking. After this information is obtained, and oftentimes photographed using concealed cameras and camcorders, they will methodically plan the most effective way to circumvent the facility’s security safeguards.
They oftentimes arrive with teams of specialists, including forklift operators, tractor trailer drivers, and surveillance personnel (who stake out the major access roads for police response) as well as technical experts who know more about electronic alarm systems than many of the companies that install them.
The end result is normally a successful heist, with the victimized company not knowing they’ve been hit until the next work shift arrives and finds that significant amounts of inventory have vanished.
Most of the companies that find their alarm systems disconnected, the video recorders missing, and several trailer loads of inventory stolen are shocked, not just by the financial loss, but by the speed and efficiency of the perpetrators.
While most victimized companies are amazed by the ingenuity and ease in which their security controls were defeated, the reality is that the professionals have been using the same methods for several years. Disconnecting phone and power lines, cutting through doors, (rather than prying them open and activating the alarm system’s magnetic contacts), and entering via the roof or wall vents, are standard operating procedure and pose little difficulty for these pros.
While there are always new, innovative methods, such as installing concealed wireless video cameras outside a building that will record employees entering their alarm codes into the lobby keypad, the professionals tend to use the same techniques that have historically been very effective for them.
To appreciate why electronic intrusion detection and video systems have been consistently compromised, it’s necessary to understand two realities about the alarm industry.
The first is that most of the sales reps that design intrusion detection and video systems have very little, if any, direct knowledge of how these professional thieves operate. While this may seem illogical, it’s none the less true.
Danbee Investigations has investigated over $100 million dollars worth of thefts by professional crime organizations. When we’re asked to conduct a post-theft investigation, we meet with representatives from the security system provider who designed and installed the facility’s electronic protective systems. During these discussions, we typically ask these sales representatives if they’re familiar with the professional thieves and their standard operating practices, i.e., how they defeat high-tech security systems. Ninety-nine out of 100 times, their response is, “No.” However, these same sales reps are the ones that distribution company executives typically rely upon to select the right technology, strategically position all the protective devices, and then properly program these systems.
Another reality is that alarm companies have minimal legal or financial responsibility for losses sustained by their customers. Regardless of whether for example, the wrong devices were selected, or if the central station operator failed to properly respond to an activation, alarm vendors have limited liability. If you doubt this, read the small print in your contract and you’ll probably find not one, but two or three causes that stipulate this.
This is not an indictment of alarm and video system providers. The reality is that they would not be able to obtain insurance if they assumed this type of responsibility. Because alarm companies could potentially be paying out millions each year, their contracts essentially state that they are not “insurers.”
Considering the limited understanding that many security system sales representatives possess, businesses should be wary about relying on a vendor to design their electronic protection. There is a significant difference between having your security systems designed by a salesman and an independent security consultant.
2/1
2011
2011
Cargo Theft: The Latest Intelligence Regarding Professional Crime Organizations
More product than ever is being shipped to warehouses, stores and directly to consumers by truck. As a result, professional criminals have found that there is a fortune to be made by stealing these “warehouses on wheels.”
Once the exclusive domain of established organized crime families, dozens of new cargo theft rings have sprung up across the United States in the last ten years. In some parts of the country, law enforcement officials are overwhelmed and simply unable to keep up with the case load.
As reported in a 2010 Wall Street Journal article, law enforcement agencies and insurance companies are both reporting increases in cargo theft activity. Chubb Corporation, a major insurance company based in N.J., reported that insurance claims and data from other sources showed cargo thefts in 2009 increased 6.6% from 2008, and were up 23% from 2007.
Attracted by the number of trucks on the road, the lax security controls utilized by many warehousing and transportation firms, the low probability of being caught, as well as the resale value of the goods, cargo theft has become an extremely profitable enterprise. Here are some of the tactics they frequently utilize:
• They are so confident in their ability to be successful that the product is oftentimes sold before the truck thefts or distribution center break-ins have even taken place.
• They have been known to infiltrate their members into companies posing as employees, vendors and contract labor, which has proven to be an excellent source of inside intelligence for them.
• It’s not unusual for them to conduct surveillance on a targeted DC or to follow trucks for extensive periods of time before striking.
• They are extremely familiar with almost every variety of GPS, including where the antennas are concealed. Consequently, they can have most GPS units disabled within minutes.
• They frequently conduct surveillance at truck stops commonly used by drivers looking for targets.
• They have been known to lease warehouses in various parts of the country with interior loading docks to safely conceal the trucks they steal and store goods.
1/3
2011
2011
Why Theft Escalates in a Recessionary Economy
This distributor had historically been running acceptable inventory variances. Although there were occasional periods in the past where this company experienced discrepancies, management had never seen numbers this bad. Over the last six months, their cycle counts revealed an increase in shrinkage of more than 400%.
Unable to find an operational explanation for this, they decided to have a confidential investigation conducted. The undercover operation we conducted subsequently exposed a group of employees who were stealing company inventory each week. When these workers were apprehended, they admitted that while they had not previously stolen company inventory, recent events put them in a position where they felt they desperately needed extra income. After considering the alternatives, they decided that stealing from their employer provided the easiest way to supplement their income with the least amount of risk.
If you regularly read business publications, you have probably noticed more stories about business crime over the last two years. This is no coincidence. There is a direct correlation between this increase in criminal activity and the recessionary economy.
Employees are being driven to dishonest activity by financial need. With tens of thousands of companies instituting cost cutting measures, employees see their personal income at risk. Wage freezes, benefit reductions, reduced or eliminated overtime pay and vanishing bonuses, as well as plunging stock value, are the grim financial realities facing both white and blue collar workers today. In worst case scenarios, jobs are being completely eliminated and the prospects of finding a new one are bleak which is why Congress has extended unemployment benefits.
Even if cutbacks have not yet taken place, many workers believe that it is just a matter of time before their employers put them in effect. A growing percentage of employees see this belt tightening as unfair or unjustified, and at the same time feel pressured to find an alternative means of income.
Unfortunately, many workers are deciding that stealing from their company offers them this opportunity. Making matters worse, some employees rationalize and convince themselves they’re doing nothing wrong.
Employees who we’ve apprehended have offered a variety of explanations, many of them stating that they were simply taking what they felt they were entitled to. One supervisor caught defrauding his employer explained it this way, “I’ve worked hard for this company for a long time and I didn’t see the owners making sacrifices like they expected us to.”
Another dishonest distribution center employee, who was working in collusion with several co-workers, stated that he was “just doing it to them before they did it to me”.
These rationalizations don’t only extend to company workers. Unfortunately, vendors, contractors and even some customers can adopt a similar mind set when confronted with serious financial pressures.
We exposed one such theft operation that was taking place between a company driver and a customer that he regularly made delivers to. In this case, it was the customer who made the overture, asking the driver one day if he had any extra product he wanted to sell for cash. When the driver replied that he didn’t, the customer then suggested that if he reported a delivery shortage and the driver corroborated his story, there would be no way to disprove the bogus claim. The driver agreed and ended up selling the customer several cases of product for 30% of its legitimate value.
After doing this a few times, the customer told the driver that if he was able to “short deliver” other customers on his run, or arrange to have extra product “overloaded” onto his truck by other employees at his warehouse, he would gladly pay him in cash for the goods. After we apprehended the driver and then interviewed the customer, he admitted he had acted out of desperation.
Prompted by a downturn in sales and cash flow problems, this customer aggressively sought ways to generate additional profit, and before long he and the driver were netting nearly $1,500 a week by transacting stolen merchandise.
12/27
2010
2010
How to Avoid Being Duped When Verifying Background Information
Candidates who want to circumvent your screening process to hide a history of violence may resort to providing a “prepared cover” which allows them to conceal parts of their background that they do not want you to learn about. Oftentimes, this will involve creating fictitious addresses, places of employment, and work related references.
One way to avoid falling victim to a “prepared cover” is to properly verify addresses and telephone numbers provided by candidates. If, for example, a candidate lists his prior employer as Rosewood Logistics, located at 100 Valley Way, Los Angeles, do not simply accept this as a bonafide company or address. Rosewood Logistics may have been created by the candidate for the sole purpose of serving as past employment. The address provided could be a rented mailbox and the telephone number could be forwarded to a friend who is waiting for the opportunity to give the candidate a favorable reference.
To avoid being manipulated, check a directory to see if the company is listed, and if so, what their address and telephone number is. It may also be worthwhile to access a Dun and Bradstreet report to see if they are registered. If the telephone number or address is different, contact the company via the phone number and address you found, not with the information provided by the candidate.
Another red flag is a company that the candidate claims has relocated or gone out of business. While this may be true, it is an effective way to conceal an individual’s real history by providing a dead-end reference. Most companies simply accept this as fact instead of researching the company to see if, in fact, it did exist and whether the move or bankruptcy occurred when the candidate claimed that it took place.
4/15
2010
2010
Avoiding Pitfalls When Conducting Foreign Supply Chain Security Audits
by Barry Brandman
Here are two reasons why supply chain security should be taken seriously:
1. If your safeguards look considerably better on paper than they work in reality, your company faces the risk of having illegal narcotics or a weapon of mass destruction smuggled into the United States via one of your shipments.
2. The other risk you face is that when C-TPAT inspectors validate your foreign suppliers and logistics providers, they may find your controls woefully inadequate and lower your tier level or even remove you from the C-TPAT program.
If you want to protect your import shipments from theft, smuggling and terrorism, you’ll need to have a diligent auditing process in place. Aside from it being a C-TPAT requirement, it’s also one of the most critical components of your security program.
One of the primary objectives when performing a comprehensive security audit is to separate fact from fiction.
Prior to conducting one of our C-TPAT compliance audits at a foreign distribution center, we had been assured that all their security controls were being diligently followed and our client’s product was extremely well protected.
Prior to our arrival, this consolidator had informed us that they had complete video coverage throughout their facility, tight control over inbound and outbound goods and that our clients’ product was always kept in a highly secured segregated area.
What we observed however was quiet different. Not only were the CCTV camera views providing terrible clarity, but our client’s goods were not being monitored from the time they were taken off an inbound truck to the time they were eventually reloaded for transport to the Hong Kong seaport. There were numerous “blind spots” where our client’s product could have been tampered with and completely avoided observation by their video system
We found that their digital hard drive was much too small, only archiving recorded video for 7 days – an inadequate period of time in the event that a post event investigation was required in the future.
We also exposed loopholes with their cargo handling practices. Inbound truck security seals for example, were being removed by anyone working on the receiving dock rather than by more senior personnel (which is what their policy called for). Consequently, we found that many workers did not take the time to verify that the seal number on an arriving truck matched the manifest (another major policy violation).
We also found that the seals used on outbound trucks were left exposed in an open box on the shipping dock, fully accessible to all employees, vendors and outside truckers. Because the shipping crew didn’t use seals in numerical sequence, these exposed seals could have been stolen and then reattached to a truck’s cargo doors after a driver left their facility.
Insofar as our client’s product being segregated “in a highly secured area”, we observed that the fencing was only 8’ high and had no ceiling to protect against employees simply climbing over it. We also found that the keypad code to this area hadn’t been changed in nearly nine months and was known to most of the workforce (including those without clearance to this area). Additionally, we determined that the alarm system was only being armed at the end of each workday, even when there was no work being performed in this area for hours at a time.
These issues, as well as an array of other security loopholes that were exposed, were promptly addressed and remedied. However, had this audit not been performed, our client’s risk factor would have remained unnecessarily high.
Training is another important component, yet it’s frequently not provided when an on site assessment is performed. During a recent C-TPAT training program we conducted for a foreign manufacturer, we asked if anyone knew whether bolt seals could be circumvented. Ninety percent of those in attendance responded that it was impossible to manipulate them. The problem here is that bolt seals can in fact be circumvented a number of ways and if those responsible for seal integrity think they’re foolproof, they’ll never recognize and expose breaches when they do occur.
When evaluating the quality of a foreign site’s security program, it’s’ also important to avoid “getting lost in the translation.” Because C-TPAT focuses on imports, working with foreign companies is commonplace.
Cultural differences and language barriers can result in misleading responses and faulty conclusions. It’s for this reason that we deliberately ask the same questions several times (although they are worded differently) in our supply chain security questionnaires sent out to foreign suppliers and logistics providers. When respondents answer yes on page one and no on page five to the same question, we know that they either didn’t understand what we were asking or weren’t providing us with accurate responses.
It’s also a good idea to confirm questionnaire responses through follow up e-mails and conference calls. More often than not, we receive feedback that differs from many of the original answers that were provided to us.
Is it a case of some foreign firms wanting to look more secure than they really are for their U.S. based customers? Or, did the respondents have different interpretations of words or phrases, resulting in inaccurate feedback?
Whatever the reason, you can’t afford to be inadvertently or deliberately misled if you want to know that your supply chain is in fact as secure as it needs to be.
3/26
2010
2010
Annual C-TPAT Conference
by Barry Brandman
Last week I attended the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism annual conference in Anaheim, California. This much anticipated event sold out within hours of being announced on the Customs & Border Protection website.
This annual conference not only provides certified member companies with the opportunity to learn about the state of the program and interact with senior government officials, but also receive a briefing about changes that will be taking place with the C-TPAT program.
The roster of speakers was impressive, and included David Aguilar, the acting Deputy Commissioner of U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Bradd Skinner, Director of the C-TPAT program, Kevin Weeks, Director of Field Operations for CBP’s Los Angeles office, as well as Richard Dinucci, CBP’s Director of Cargo Control. Director Skinner discussed an array of topics, including the C-TPAT program’s growth, up 7.8% in 2009 and expected to exceed 10,000 member companies this year.
Conference sessions also featured speakers from the private sector, who provided insight from the industry perspective.
I was asked to give a presentation on “Tools, Technologies and Processes – Innovative Industry Solutions to Security Challenges.” I focused on areas within the foreign supply chain where we have uncovered significant risk and gave specific examples of why many corporate security programs look much better on paper than they actually operate on a day-to-day basis. I also explained several of the most important safeguards of a world class supply chain asset protection program, including how to design state-of-the-art intrusion detection and video systems, as well as how to get the most from GPS tracking technology and cargo security Best Practices.
There is no question that the C-TPAT program has become respected worldwide, with many countries developing their own supply chain security programs modeled on C-TPAT standards. Other countries like Japan, Canada and Jordan have already entered into mutual recognition programs with the United States, which is beneficial for the government as well as the trade community.
I believe that C-TPAT is a critical component of our homeland security efforts. This government–industry cooperative program proves that when these two sectors work together effectively towards a common objective, very significant results can be achieved.
2/25
2010
2010
2010 Supply Chain Security Webinar
by Barry Brandman
Today, I participated as a guest speaker for the 2010 Supply Chain Security Webinar.
This program focused on strategies for minimizing supply chain security risk, a growing concern for manufacturers, distributors, and transportation companies. Along with myself, experts from Cisco, Powers International, Customs & Trade Solutions, Accenture, as well as the National Custom Brokers & Forwarders Association and the Air Forwarders Association gave presentations.
My session was entitled, “Are Your Profits Quietly Being Stolen – What Every Supply Chain Company Should Know.” One of the areas I focused on was seven of the biggest myths about distribution center security. I explained why, for example, common misconceptions such as “If we sustain a theft due to a faulty intrusion detection system, our alarm company will be responsible” and “Our camera system will keep our workers honest” have caused companies significant loss.
I also explained some of the essential components of a successful loss prevention program and why it’s so important to realistically assess your safeguards so you can uncover weaknesses before others have the opportunity to exploit them.
One of the ever present concerns for logistics executives is collusion between inside personnel and truckers. With cargo crime estimated between $20-40 billion a year, companies are eager to learn which methods and technologies can effectively prevent and detect this type of criminal activity. As a result, I made it a point to provide some proactive solutions that have dramatically reduced this costly problem for many of our clients.
